The External Policy of Syria Between the Constants and Variables   

  Omar Deeb Abdel Hameed

Many opinions determine that the external policy of Syria had various changes during the last three decades. These opinions might have an objective basis but should not be exaggerated because the external policy of Syria was marked by its constancy in most matters. The alterations were, often, the result of certain developments in which the interior factors and the international and regional political diversions overlapped. These developments affected the whole region, in general, and Syria, in particular.

The Regional Effects:

Reviewing some important international and regional political developments that affected the external policy of Syria during the last three decades leads us to stop by regional occurrences, such as, the Arabic-Israeli war of Tashreen in 1973. As a result, after the Syrian role retreated by the debacle of June 1967, an active Syrian policy revived which turned Damascus to be a prominent power in the region and the related policies. This presence of Syria paved the way for its progress and obtaining a principal role that faced the Egyptian policy, which diverted from the conflict with Israel to the settlement with it after the year 1975.

The other regional event that affected the external Syrian policy was the Civil War of Lebanon in 1975 and the entry of the Syrian Military Forces to Lebanon. This allowed Syria to extend its power and domination upon Lebanon and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which used Lebanon as its base. In spite of the various Israeli invasions to Lebanon, especially, the invasion of 1982, Syria preserved a strong influence and relation with the Lebanese State and its political elite. Actually, Syria accomplished this influence through its political and military presence. Also, Syria preserved its relation with the rest of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon in addition to the important Palestinian presence in Syria, which represented an important presence of the total Palestinian position. Moreover, in spite of the various efforts to close the only opened Arab frontier in the South of Lebanon, Syria preserved its indirect influence upon this front. On the other hand, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was included within the important regional occurrences that affected the Syrian policy, which supported this revolution with great enthusiasm. Unlike the attitude of most Arab countries, the Syrian attitude continued to support Iran in the Iraqi-Iranian war (1980-1987). Even though the Syrian attitude was considered a withdrawal of the general Arabic attitude, it practically assisted two principle matters. First, the Syrian attitude prevented the transfer of the Iraqi-Iranian war into an Arab-Iranian war. Second, the Syrian role assisted, later on, the reconciliation between Iran and the majority of the Arab countries, especially, the Gulf region.

The International Effects:

The most two important international developments that affected the current Syrian external relations happened successively, first, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the eastern European countries, second, the 2nd Gulf war. The collapse of the Soviet Union represented the absence of a main political, military and economical strong cover and support for Syria and its policy. For example, the Soviet support prevented the deterioration of the Syrian military in the second stage of 1973 war and compensated all the military losses. Again, after the Israeli invasion to Lebanon in the summer of 1982, Moscow compensated the Syrian losses that resulted from confronting Israel.

The Soviet support was not only concerned with the military side but, also, exceeded that to the political side. In 1981, Syria and the Soviet Union signed the agreement of friendship and co-operation that included the Soviet protection for Syria and its military presence in Lebanon against the threats, especially, the Israeli threats.

The 2nd Gulf War of 1991 was an international occurrence, which greatly affected the Syrian external policy. Accordingly, for the first time, Damascus entered the international political military alliance, led by the United States, which declared war against Iraq to force out the Iraqi forces from Kuwait and stabilize a direct western presence in the Gulf region. This occurrence was an introduction for the Syrian engagement in direct negotiations with Israel for the political reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict through the Conference of Madrid. This attitude seemed to be a new diversion of the Syrian policy toward Israel.

The Interior Effects:

Naturally, not only the regional and international developments affected the external policy of Syria, but also some interior factors and developments, too.

There were three interior subjects that affected the external policy of Syria. The first was the need for social and economical developments, the second was represented by the interior conflicts, especially, the violent ones, and the third was the death of the president Hafez Assad in summer 2000.

Due to the necessity for developing the social and political structures, Syria deepened its relations with the Soviet Union and the group of socialist countries. For ideological and strategic reasons the socialist countries were ready to submit assistance for the social and economical development in Syria. During the cold war, the choice of this relation with the socialist countries led to a definite classification of the Syrian external policy. Although Syria tried many times to establish paralleled relations with other countries, especially, the western European countries but its success was limited because of different and overlapping reasons, mainly, the inability and lack of desire to accord with the Syrian political needs on the interior and external levels. As a result, the external policy of Syria concentrated more on the relation with the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries.

At the beginning of the Syrian diversion toward an open policy in the nineties, Syria directed its external relations to the countries that it had very limited former relations with or never had any. The interior conflicts from the middle of the seventies to the beginning of the eighties affected the external policy of Syria. The extended conflict with the armed Islamic groups was the most important interior conflict, which led into tense and threatening confrontations between Syria and some of its neighboring countries. In fact, Iraq and Jordan, openly, supported the armed Islamic groups and their activities in Syria. Less severe similar matters happened with some western European countries, like Germany, which Syria had accused for sheltering some opposing leaders of Islamic groups.

The Prominent Features of External Policy:

Through the direct supervision of President Hafez Assad, the stability of the directing center of external policy was a very effective factor for this policy. In spite of several executive assistants, who were next to the president during thirty years, Hafez Assad used to supervise the external policy, directly, and follow its accurate details. This supervision distinguished the Syrian external policy for its stability and high credibility in dealing with other external political sides.

The past three decades showed that the features of the Syrian external policy are based upon the benefits in the international atmosphere. In fact, the relations with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries were modified to consolidate the relation with the western countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rest of socialist countries.

The Syrian external policy was, closely, related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which Syria still confirms its attitude toward a fair and a comprehensive solution that includes regaining the Arab occupied land and ensuring the rights of the Palestinian nation. Accordingly, Syria remained in a continuous confrontation with the Israeli policy and its attitudes; also, it had disagreements with regional and Arab sides. Thus, after the agreement of Oslo in 1993 Syria disagreed with PLO and after the agreement of Arabah Valley in 1994, Syria disagreed with Jordan. Also, after the military-security agreement with Israel in 1996, Syria disagreed with Turkey. One principle reason for the strong relation between Syria and Iran is due to the antagonistic Iranian attitude toward Israel.

The general feature of the Syrian external policy, which was sketched and consolidated during three decades, still continues the same with little justifications. Due to the need to renew the Syrian policy and exceed the retreat of the Syrian external relations during the eighties, some little justifications took place in the recent years. The deterioration of the Syrian relations with the neighboring countries was a result of their interference with its interior affairs and supporting the political and armed oppositions. Therefore, the Syrian relations worsened with Jordan, Iraq and Turkey in addition to the Palestinian position, especially, after PLO left Lebanon in 1982.

The Syrian deteriorated relations with the Arabic sides were accompanied with another deterioration with other countries, mainly, the western countries. These countries, often, protested against the Syrian policy, not only in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also to its policy in Lebanon and with the Palestinians. Accordingly, Syria suffered a political and economical siege, which occurred at the same time with the deterioration of its economical and political interior positions.

The general deterioration of the Syrian relations led Syria to change its international and Arabic policy and decline the tension of its attitude in dealing with the developments and occurrences but without neglecting its stable policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Latest Developments:

According to the new adjustments, after the Conference of Madrid in 1991, Syria adopted the tendency for peace as a strategic choice. Therefore, Syria was involved in negotiations with Israel in order to reach agreements of peace for both sides. However, the different negotiations did not lead into an agreement that achieved the demands of Syria, especially, the subjects, which were related to the Israeli withdrawal from Golan according to the decisions of the international legitimacy and the principle of "land in return for peace".

In the context of changing external policy, since 1998, Syria tended to improve its international and Arabic relations, particularly, the Iraqi relation, which was always tense and clashing. The improvement included the economical and political relations, and the Syrian call for releasing the siege from Iraq and rejecting the American-British project of "intelligent sanctions". The same happened with Turkey, after the tension, which almost led to military confrontations in 1998, Syria established a positive development with its neighbor in the north on various levels, mainly, the economical relations.

Also, after the tension that followed signing the agreement of Arabah Valley in 1994, the death of King Hussein was an occasion for improving the Syrian-Jordanian relations. Although the Syrian-Jordanian relations did not greatly improve, the clashes calmed down and some channels were opened for integrating the relationships between the two countries for future developments.

The recent changes of the external Syrian policy could not be reviewed without considering the position of Bashar Assad, who since 1997 started to follow some files of the external policy, like the Lebanese matter. Bashar's influence enlarged by becoming the president in summer 2000. His role was decisive toward the Syrian-Palestinian closeness. In March 2001, presidents Bashar Assad and Yaser Araft met at the Arab Summit in Amman. Both presidents agreed for new relations that were followed by an active movement of the Palestinian officials in Damascus and a clear Syrian change of its media and political speech that related to the Palestinian file and the Palestinian authority.

Also, during the recent years, Syria made steps to improve its relation with Lebanon and consolidate that through mutual agreements. It also attempted to strengthen the relation with wide different Lebanese classes and their political groups, up to supporting the Lebanese struggle against Israel in the south of Lebanon. The Syrian attitude assisted disassembling the militias of Antoin Lahd and the Israeli withdrawal from the south of Lebanon on May 2000.

These developments were accompanied with the decline of the Syrian interference in the Lebanese interior affairs, such as, the Syrian attitude toward the latest Lebanese Parliamentary elections. The Syrian attitude assisted the success of some opponents, who were against the Syrian existence in Lebanon. Besides, Syria declined its direct response for those who criticized its existence in Lebanon.

Since Bashar Assad became a president, two matters had affected the Syrian-Lebanese relation. The first matter was related to the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the unnecessary existence of the Syrian forces in Lebanon. Secondly, the rise of Syrian movements that demanded political and democratic reformations. These conditions facilitated the Lebanese moves to demand reviewing the Syrian-Lebanese relations and renewing its frame.

The Lebanese movements against the Syrian existence in Lebanon included political powers and religious institutions that extended into strikes and demonstrations. The matter was argued inside the Parliament and discussed in the Arabic and Lebanese newspapers. The Lebanese movements, which some of them extended outside Lebanon, were mainly Christian. Thus, the movements had sectarian and group aspects that aroused negative reactions among some groups who supported Syria. Consequently, a Lebanese movement aroused in return to support the Syrian existence in Lebanon and call for the necessity to consolidate the Syrian-Lebanese relations.

According to the opposition, the problem is not due to the Syrian-Lebanese relation but to the nature of the Syrian existence in Lebanon and its implications on the interior and external levels. The opposition believes that the continuity of the Syrian existence in Lebanon, as it is now, disparages the Lebanese sovereignty and its national decision because Lebanon became a follower to the Syrian policy. Thus, the opposition objects the Syrian interference in all the Lebanese affairs, mainly, through the bodies of security. Besides, Syria has an economical domination in Lebanon because it overwhelmed the Lebanese market with Syrian goods and laborers. This, of course, worsens the economical and social positions of the Lebanese.

Syria had doubled responses to these movements through declaring its rejection to yield to the movements' pressures and responding to their demands. Therefore, the Syrian forces withdrew from Beirut and their number was declined to 25.000 thousand soldiers. The reality reflects the hesitation of the Syrian policy in Lebanon between continuing the same former way by dominating the Lebanese affairs or establishing new relations that exceed the past conditions and form a distinguished equal relation for the benefits of both nations and countries. Actually, Syria and Lebanon have a historical, social, political and geographical link, which can not be separated or exceeded.

A more cautious relation with the United States and its policy in the region accompanied the changes of the Syrian policy toward its neighbors, especially, the attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian matter and the attitude to Iraq and the imposed sanctions.

While Syria had cautiousness with the United States, it had openness with the European countries. Thus, Syria attempted to loosen the suspended matters, like treating the loans from Germany and the out-standing problems with the companies of East Germany after the unification of both German sides. Accordingly, President Bashar Assad visited Spain, France and Germany in which he dealt with the dual relations on various levels. Also, he dealt with the relations of these countries and the European Union, in general, with the matters of the region, mainly, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the operation of peace. In fact, Syria attempts to set up a noticeable European role in the region that either parallels to the American role or co-operates with it, which is more possible according to the directions of most European countries.

The Syrian-European Partnership:

During the recent years, the Syrian-European partnership was the most important subject that marked the Syrian relations with the European countries. Although six rounds of negotiations did not reach any agreement, yet, the problems of partnership and the attitudes of both sides were clarified in which will affect to reach a clear agreement.

One fundamental problem would arise by the Syrian-European partnership, which is their effect on the economical, social and political structures in Syria. In fact, due to weak, limited production and high costs, the free exchange of goods and products would impose negative influences on the Syrian industry. Therefore, even in the local market, the Syrian goods would not have the capacity to compete with the foreign production. Consequently, while the Syrian people are complaining of unemployment, hundreds of companies and factories would be closed and thousands of laborers would be tramped. According to official statistics, the percentage of unemployment in Syria is 20%. Moreover, in order to compete with the European industries, there are clear differences of the methods and costs to rehabilitate the Syrian industry.

The other related problem to the Syrian-European partnership is the launch campaign of strict restrictions, which prevents the Syrian agricultural production to enter the European market. Thus, while the Syrian market will be opened for the European agricultural productions, Syria would be deprived of this competition. In this case, the same results might happen in the industrial sector. This means that the Syrian agriculture might be destroyed and the unemployment in cities and villages would enlarge.

The economical and social problems are a part of other problems that result from the partnership, which includes political problems as well. The political side was more clarified at the European-Mediterranean Partnership Conference that was held in Damascus on March 2001 to discuss the partnership between Syria and the European Union in which various lectures and discussions were submitted. At the meeting, clear disagreements appeared like, the disappointment of the European side about the economical reformation in Syria that did not accord with the political reformation in order to meet the necessities of the partnership and the international, commercial and economical relations. In return, the Syrian side confirmed that the steps of reformation were progressing according to its national and nationalist vision, besides, each country has its particularity without restraining to a definite form of reformation that is applied in other countries.

The discussions clarified the dissimilarity of thoughts between both sides about the concept of partnership. While the European side confirmed the type of partnership as a commercial one, the Syrian side wanted a developmental partnership in which Europe would assist in rehabilitation and training, besides, increasing the European investment in Syria. According to Syria, the real partnership means to submit all the agricultural, industrial and commercial files, including the field of investment.

The attempts for a Syrian-European partnership prove the interest of both sides, but the differences of each side's visions restrain achieving an agreement. Therefore, the position should be more carefully examined to reach a real positive partnership for both sides, which is the essence and basis of a partnership.

Conclusions:

After Bashar Assad became a president, due to three main factors, the Syrian external policy witnessed changes in the international, regional and Arab relations:

- First, the new president has different specifications and qualifications that differ from the previous one, as well as, his way of dealing with the external policy. Accordingly, president Bashar visited many Arab and foreign countries during his first year of presidency. Also, he participated in both Arab Summits in Cairo and Amman, in addition to the Islamic Summit in Doha.

- Second, new facts affected the Syrian policy, mainly, the deterioration of the economical position and the necessity for treating it. The treatment is, surely, related to the external policy of Syria and the attempts to improve and extend the political and economical relations.

- Third, new economical and political facts emerged in the field of international, regional and Arab relations, which are imposed upon Syria and other countries in the world. Nowadays, there is a tendency for co-operation among various countries to execute projects and establish markets, such as, the regional electrical project that links Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, also, the Grand Arab Free Trade Zone Agreement, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement and the agreement of GAT.

Within these factors we can notice the active movement of the Syrian officials and its effects in the external policy. During last year, high Syrian officials visited most Arab and foreign countries, especially, those that had traditional and solid relations with Syria. The visits were accompanied by signing agreements between both sides to consolidate the relations in various fields, mainly, the commercial.

The results of changing the Syrian external policy and the active movements are subjected to necessary interior modifications in Syria on the social, economical and political level, which would modify the structure of society and state. In fact, it is illogical to separate between the interior and the external policies and have each in different direction.