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The Syrian Economy: The Reality and The Prospects Amer Mahmood The Syrian economy has a distinguished balanced sector's structure, as well as an important economical, human and natural resources along with a significant geographical location which represents a tying knot among three continents: Asia, Europe and Africa.
The individual annual income classifies
At the end of year 1999, the population of
No significant changes occurred to the
gender percentage, which was still about 104
men for each 100 women. Although, the percentage of people who were
younger than 15 years old had lowered from 44.8% in 1994 to 40.5% in
1999, yet, this percentage is still considered a high one in comparison
to other countries. Therefore, it could be said that
In spite of the annual decrease of the
population growth from 3.3% during 1981 - 1994 to 2.7% during 1994 -
1999, the average of growth remains high in comparison to other
countries' growth. However
Taking a look at the available
agricultural possibilities in
Despite its deterioration in the last few
years due to drought, the animal wealth still represents an important
resource for
In addition to the reasonable agricultural
capacity,
Tourism capacity is as important as other
available wealth resources in However, these important natural resources were not properly invested, therefore, Syrian economy became weak and unappealing to the available capacities. The estimations of ESCWA (Social- Economical Commission of West Asia) refer to the average growth of total local production in 1999 being the weakest in the surrounding area, the Syrian growth average resgestering an increase of less than 1%ژ(5)گ. This reality of Syrian economy urges the following question: what caused the weakness of economical function despite the availability of all these important resources? To answer this question let's to take quick review of the development of the syrian economy in the last 40 years. * * * The Syrian economy witnessed various drops and rises due to diverse interior and exterior factors throughout the second half of the twentieth century. In the period between 1966 and 1970, Syrian economy did not function satisfactorily. The annual agricultural growth average did not increase more than 1% in fixed pricesژ(6)گ. - Many factors were behind this deterioration including the inappropriate climate, The delay of distribution of lands, regulated by the reformed agrarian law,the slow growth of Agricultural Co-operatives the decrease of agricultural loans percentage, the reduction of importation of agricultural vehicles, fertilizers and disinfectants and the decline of investment in the agricultural sector. The Industrial sector was not in better shape. Due to the rise of production' costs and the decrease of products quality, the financial surplus of public industrial organizations dropped, leading in a decrease in the average of total industrial production, which ranged between 49% to 67%, during the second half of 60iesژ(7)گ. In spite of oil exportation increase, general exports suffered a continuous recession because of the agricultural products reduction and the perpetual impotency of payment scale since 1968. The progressive increase of general expenditure, which was mainly financed by banking institutions, caused the increase of currency mass that grew during 1966 to 1970 with an annual average of 13%ژ(8)گ. To treat this recession, the Syrian government took various procedures toward economical openness. In 1971, some measures were processed to activate importation, such as, allowing the private sectors to import certain goods provided they can afford foreign credit facilities for at least 365 days and to pay in foreign currency from their own external accounts. In a step to encourage the Syrians to retain back to their smuggled capitals, the government allowed them to import some raw materials and spare parts including some previously prohibited western goods with the conditions of financing importation from their own external accounts.
Beside the official Money Market, a new
Parallel Market was established in 1971. The Commercial Bank of
The General Organization of Free Zone was
established to urge export industries and captivate Arab capitals and
investments. Specific areas were reserved in Latakiah, In spite of all the previous important measures, the results were not as expected due to several reasons, mainly the reluctancy of the private sector to assist with the economical growth because these measures were not taken through a comprehensive long-term strategy. The Syrian economy developed noticeably in the seventies. A high average of growth was achieved with an annual average of 10%. ژ(10)گ As the private sector withdrew from effective participation in economical growth, the government had to be completely responsible for raising up the national economy. Therefore, the public investment growth increased from 3.9 billion Syrian pounds in the second fifth plan (1966-1970) to 12.7 billion Syrian pounds in the third fifth plan (1971-1975), then to 50.5 billion Syrian pound in fourth fifth plan (1976-1980)ژ(11)گ. The Investment program of the third and fourth plan, principally, aimed to have a quick industrial growth, an increase of irrigated lands and a development of the structures. Official statistics point out that the total local production increased in fixed prices of 1985 from 27967 million Syrian pounds in 1970 to 72078 million Syrian pounds in 1980ژ(12)گ. Moreover, the running energy power enlarged from 333 megawatt in 1970 to 1073 megawatt in 1980. On the other hand, highways length increased from 11687 kilometer in 1970 to 19819 kilometer in 1980. The new railway net widened from 1140 kilometer in 1970 to 2017 kilometer in 1980. As for drinking water in cities centers, its production increased from 135627 thousand cubic meters in 1970 to 301432 thousand cubic meters in 1980. The number of primary schools increased from 5261 schools in 1970 to 7689 schools in 1980. Elementary and secondary schools increased from 813 schools in 1970 to 1330 schools in 1980ژ(13)گ. The achieved growth during the 70ies was, principally due to the high performance of the construction and service sectors. Other productive sectors, industrial and agricultural, were inefficient during the second half of the 70ies because of different factors. The main causes of slow growth in the agricultural sector were: the delay of projects achievement to increase the irrigated areas of the reformed agrarian law, the decrease of intensified crops, the weak services of agricultural orientation as well as the extreme interference of government with the vital affairs of agricultural sector, like specifying the type of crops and restricting the purchase of tools and supplements by the government only. On the other hand, the weak efficiency of the industrial sector was due to the delay of achieving most projects, which was caused by: One - The deficiencies of economical and technical studies. Two - The loose commitments of foreign countries to achieve projects because of various gaps in contracts provisions. Three - The weak supervision and persuasion of project achievement. The former effects did not only delay project achievements and operation, but also caused technical problems of installations and execution for other industires which made it impossible to continue with its full productive power. This of course, assisted to the decline of industrial growth average. In fact, the phenomenon of delay in the development project dominated most industrial sectors during the third fifth plan (1971-1975) and fourth fifth plan (1976-1980). The main reason for this phenomenon is the extravagant ambitions of both plans. The investments programs of both plans did not agree with the consumption capacities of Syrian economy investments. Although the financial execution of the second plan (1966-1970) did not exceed 77%ژ(14)گ, the third plan (1971-1975) investments were raised three times compared to the second one. The fourth plan (1976-1980) raise of investments exceeded about four times the third one. The discordance among the ambitious investments programs and the limited capacity of investments of Syrian economy caused a severe deficiency in various industrial sectors which were supposed to supply the needs of growth projects of both latter plans. Severe deficiencies covered different fields, which extended from manpower to raw materials. It affected negatively, the facilities of transport and cargo, port capacities to unload and store goods, infra structure installations such as roads, railway, telecommunications, water and electricity nets. Having huge and plenty of growth projects in both third and fourth plans, the specialized technical institutes of the government could not maintain an efficient role to review all the economical studies and the designed plans nor could it pursuit and supervise these projects. In the absence of a balance between the investment programs of third and fourth plans and the consumption capacities of investments in Syrian economy, deficiencies did not only delay the achievements of growth projects for more than two years but it also caused a noticeable higher cost of projects. Actually, many useful projects turned to be diffusive and a heavy load on the national economy later on. The discordance between the size of investment programs of third and fourth plans and the consumption capacity was connected with another imbalance between fast and forward projects outcome, and between the productive and the cervical projects. In fact, the adherence to develop the basic structure and to increase the irrigated areas for the growth of agricultural sector required specifying enormous projects of investment to afford land reclamation projects, roads, railways and electricity at the expense of other useful projects, which increased crops and improved industrial production.Evidently, reclaiming lands and planting it takes many years to start production. On the other hand,the projects of the infrastructure do not produce goods for sale and consumption to absorb the purchasing power, which retain the expenses of these projects. The delay of achieving the industrial and agricultural productive projects and the concentration on long term productive projects at the expense of short-term projects increased the gap between offer and demand of goods in the local market. Importation did not help to close the gap because of severe lack of foreign currency, accordingly, smuggling increased with higher prices and black market enlarged. The crisis of intensive supply assisted the Syrian bourgeois commerce to achieve manipulated profits at the expense of people restricted incomes. The increase of salaries and wages during the seventies did not accord with the actual high prices, thus the real income of most citizens decreased noticebly During the eighties, the default of Syrian economy expanded due to the ambitious unbalanced plans of growth. Whenever the lack of equilibrium in the internal and external balance increased, the crisis grew bigger. The gap between cash flow and financial flow widened. One study refers to the years from 1980 till 1990 that the capital mass increased up to 5.5 times, where as the total local growth production did not reach 24% in the same period of fixed pricesژ(15)گ. The deficiencies of the financial flow were due to the weakeness of the goods sectors. In fact, the inappropriate climate conditions and the continuous drought during the eighties led to the decline of the agricultural production, especially seed production that dropped noticeably in 1984. The industrial productivity also decreased during the 80ies. Actually, the insufficient local raw materials, the unavailable imported primary materials and spare parts due to the lack of foreign currency inflow led to lower the benefits of installed productive energies noticeablyژ(16)گ. Besides, the repeated electric cuts, the unskilled workers, the unqualified administration and leadership, all affected the mal function of the industrial sector. The gap between cash inflow and finance outflow caused prices to rise up to an annual average about 19,58% from 1980 to 1990ژ(17)گ.
The gap between cash inflow and finance
outflow was associated with the gap increase between available resources
and their use. The hidden inflation, which lost 90% of local currency
purchase power during the eightiesژ(18)گ,
did not help the growth of local resources. Moreover, the foreign
sources of governmental aids and loans decreased. However, aids from
Arabic countries, which were reserved for Due to the increase of importation more than the capacity of exportation, the gap between imports and exports widened. This situation caused a high deficiency in the commercial scale, which decreased from 7915 million Syrian pounds in 1980 to 9947 million SP in 1988ژ(19)گ. The extravagant value of the Syrian pound affected negatively the competitive capacity of the Syrian exportation, especially, the available crops for export. Accordingly, foreign currency resources decreased, whereas, more pressure on payment occurred. Considering all the previous defaults, it was not strange to register a negative national income growth during the eighties. The annual growth average of the national income reached 15.7% in current prices at the same time that the annual average of prices grew up to 19.58%. Thus, the national income of the year 1980 fixed prices declined to the average of 3,88% per yearژ(20)گ. Official statistics refer to the net production (after excluding productions costs) in fixed prices of 1995 that it had declined from 378.2 billion Syrian pounds in 1980 to 358.2 billion Syrian pounds in 1990ژ(21)گ. To treat the critical position of economy, the Syrian government followed a gradual policy for restoration. Therefore, since the middle of the eighties certain procedures were taken to activate the Syrian economy. Many laws and decisions were formed to encourage the private investments in agriculture, industry and tourism: 1 - Allowing the establishment of assisting firms in the agricultural sector (bestial and botanical) with a public share of 25% of the invested capital. 2 - Enabling private sectors to produce some goods which production was monopolised by the government. 3 - Giving licenses to buy and sell foreign currencies in the current prices and allowing the private sector to obtain 75% of export income in foreign currency at private accounts to finance their importation of permitted goods, which are purchased directly from the exporters. Although the private sectors assistance improved the total industry production from 22% in 1985 to 27% in 1990, yet, this partial treatment was insufficient to reform the whole position. Therefore, the continuous crisis urged the Syrian government to search for additional measures. These were the conditions of Syrian economy during the eighties. In spite of several years of revival under the effect of expanding oil excavation and proper climate for better plantation, crisis phenomenon continued dominating the general atmosphere of economy. At the end of the eighties it became clear that facing the crisis could not be delayed anymore. The Syrian government established various laws and decisions at the beginning of the nineties to activate the economy and urge the private sectors to increase their participation in the national growth. The new laws diminished the restrictions on commerce, principally by: - Allowing the market power a greater role to decide prices. - Increasing the prices of some goods. - Decreasing support for some previous supported goods. - Lessening the inspection over import and export trades. - Permitting private sector to import materials, which were previously imported by public sector only. - Actual decreasing of the Syrian pound value to cancel the differences of its value with foreign currency. - Encouraging Arabic and foreign private investments. - Allowing the private sector to invest in various industries, which were only permitted for public sector. - Graduals canceling of the restrictions that were imposed on the industry. - Facilitating licenses for the establishment of certain industrial projects. - Improving electrical power conditions. - Minimizing inspection on foreign currency. - Permitting citizens to open accounts in foreign currency which could be transferred. - Diminishing administrative restrictions and replacing it by promotions. - Adjusting the tax of incomes to a lesser value.
One of the first economical procedures was
the law No.10 of 1991. The aim of this law was to encourage investment
through different facilities and grants, mainly, allowing the
importation of all needs of the projects, free of tax and exempted of
all charges. The private firms which the government assisted 25% with
their capital were exempted of tax on income for 7
years, the independent firms were exempted from tax on income for
five years from the start of investment. The same percentage of tax
exemption was applied for the firms
properties (land and building constructions). Moreover, the investors
were allowed to open accounts in foreign currency at the Commercial Bank
of Thus, the investors became able to transfer their net shares of the projects in foreign currencies for abroad after passing five years of investment. The Article 15 permitted an extra exemption of two more years for the projects which productions of goods and services exceeded 50% of the total production during the exempted period. Other than article 15, law NO. 10 did not achieve the full necessary combination between promotions and other economical schemes, such as, nationalizing the new techniques, developing the less growing regions and the percentage of the expected added values.
In addition to the essential gaps of law
No.10, the bad accomplishment of this law reflected harmful results on
the national economy. Wrongful interpretation of law No.10, which
included tourist cars, led to the permission of importing vehicles
exempted of taxes and customs. This permission wasted a large profit to
enter the Syrian treasury aside the flowing out of huge foreign currency
capital through the black market. Thus, instead of investing private
capitals inside On the other hand, the weak restraint to law No. 10 provisions, which concerned the selection of the projects, released licenses for industrial projects without selecting the priority of production, like (chewing gum, shampoo, chips, gas water, playing cards...ext.). The lack of reviewing and the rushed economical studies caused the installation of similar industrial projects, which offered higher production than the capacity of local market consumption. Moreover, the technical specifications of goods did not meet the International market standard, therefore, masses of produced stock urged investors to consider closing their factories. If we add to all the previous troubles the complicated administrative procedures to get the necessary agreements for a license of investment, we understand the reasons for law No.10 failure to reach its expectations. Thus, the private sector investments declined with an average of 10% in 1994 -1996 and the average of 30% during 1997-1998.ژ(23)گ Without doubt, the Syrian economy flourished after the economical procedures of Syrian government at the end of the eighties. This could be seen through the higher percentage of the total local production, which reached about 8.2% during 1991-1994 of 1985 fixed pricesژ(24)گ. The total capital of the private sector increased from 6751 million Syrian pounds in 1985 to 11002 million Syrian pounds in 1995 according to fixed prices of 1985ژ(25)گ. The industrial production of the private sectors increased from 39813 million Syrian pounds in 1990 to 79769 million Syrian pounds in 1994ژ(26)گ. This flourish did not last long , due to the raise of economical problems, such as the industrial firms who suffered from accelerating their products because of export decline. Official statistics show that the total export decreased from 47282 million Syrian pounds in 1990 to 44562 million Syrian pounds in 1995ژ(27)گ. The percentage of the private sectors export of the Syrian total exportation, except oil, decreased from 68.5% in 1990 to 48.4% in 1995ژ(28)گ.
The enlarged stock problem, occurred in
the public sectors production.The stock of the General Organization of
Textile exceeded 8 milliard Syrian poundsژ(29)گ.
The decrease of importation associated with the diminished cash flow in
the local market due to the unbalanced distribution of incomes, as well
as the decline of purchase power because of the prices rise rate more
than the augment rate of incomes, plus the decline of the governmental
support. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Work prepared a study that
was presented at the Specialists meeting in Unfortunately, instead of activating the economy through broadening the interior market and adjusting wages, annulling obstacles which complicate import, reviewing tax rythm, reforming public sector, re-qualifying banks and increasing finance of general growth, the Syrian government schemed a shrank policy. The government was stressed with hallucination of declining the general budget deficiency percentage and preserving the settle of the Syrian pound value. If the Syrian government managed to decline the deficiency to less than 1% in 1997, according to the Ministry of Finance' statisticsژ(31)گ, it also succeeded to dominate and block the economical growth. The average of total local production growth in 1996 declined to (1/3) one third from the previous past two years average of growth and to 5% negative growth in 1997 than the year 1996ژ(32)گ. It is clear again that at the end of the nineties, the economical procedures did not activate economy or restore it to reach the aimed expectations. Therefore, Syrian Economy needed more efficient steps. In a new attempt to treat the economical crisis, the Syrian government formed various legislations during the year 2000. Accordingly, law No.10 of the year 1991 was adjusted, as well as the Legislative decree No. 24 of 1986, which concerned the deal with foreign currency, the law of the economical sanction and the specialization of the national securities courts. The government permitted the importation of tourist cars and allowed the establishment of private banks in the free zones. These facilities responded to the demands of most Syrian businessmen but the new adjustments were totally disappointing. In fact, the adjusted articles of the legislative decree No.24 did not terminate the fears of businessmen. Besides, the added adjustments to the economical lawof sanctions did not taccle fundamental matters. The decision of tourist cars import permission was not clear enough, thus it was so much limited and complicated to operate. Even though legislative decree No.7 included important additions which were unmentioned in law No.10 of year 1991, beside additional promotions to encourage investment, the permission for foreigners and the possibility to obtain unlimited properties may lead to a dangerous and unsafe future. Four Lebanese banks obtained licenses to open branches at the Syrian Free Zone, but the probability of their extension seemed weak because the number of investors at the free zone was limited to 350 investors. The head of Regional Economy Office declared, lately that the Regional Commission of Al Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party agreed to establish a Money Market and private banks which are formed of private assistance or joint companies. However, the Commission of Constitutional and Legislative Affairs and the Commission of Financial Laws in the Public Council did not suggest nor study such an agreement. The establishment of private banks and Money market lead to dangerous possibilities because of Syrian banks retarded conditions that are unable to compete with private banking. In spite of the governmental statements and declarations over many years to rehabilitate the Commercial Syrian Bank, no noticeable improvement occurred till now. If we add the real conditions of the Syrian Central Bank, which stopped inspecting other banks and the lack of qualified specialists, we understand the danger of establishing private banks. It is obvious that establishing private banks without the Syrian Central Bank efficient supervision would deteriorate the settlement of Syrian economy. Usually, banks support inflow to national economy veins, which represents one important aspect of its nerve system content, and reflects a negative or positive functions towards the total economy. However, the establishment of new private banks would have been useful, but after renovating, maintaining and supporting the public Syrian Banks.
As for the establishment of a Money
Market, the objective conditions and necessary demands to achieve it are
not available yet. Most companies in The main objective conditions for a successful money market are unavailable, such as the administrative and organizational factors, the specialist technical cadres, the scientific and technological structure, and the legal foundation. As much as the establishment of private banks and money market was partial and ahead of time, the treatment of industrial reformation of public sectors was awkward and lumbering without serious determination. Again, there was lots of talk about the industrial retoration of public sectors and less work to maintain it. A rescue idea might rise, from time to time, but soon would uncover its deficiency to restore the public sector. We have to confess that 'restoration' is a very complicated matter considering all the social, political and economical effects. For example, the dismissing of extra employees would lead into a severe social crisis since the economical positions were not ready and not expanded enough to absorb the extra-dismissed employees. In fact, there are hidden crises around benefits, which contradict the restoration of the economical public sector. Those who make profits from the economical public sector are against restoration. They defend the present conditions which gaps and weaknesses enable them to have more benefits. On the other hand, different opinions demand the transfer of public sector's firms into private ones to decline the load from the national economy. These opinions reflect the desire of certain sectors, which were able to enlarge their capital by legal and illegal ways. These opinions respond positively to the European theories and ignore that the economical over flow of the industrial public sector is completely transferred to the Ministry of Finance in which the investment stopped since 80ies till 1994. Actually, the unsatisfactory function of some investments was due to various factors, which were analyzed by economists who believe that the present private sector condition can not handle the responsibility of growth, thus, the public sector has an important strategic role among the economical multiplicity. Although the troubles treatments of the industril public sector have been known for a long time, the hesitations to take serious procedures toward restoration overcome the situation. The danger of this attitude is clarified through the agreement of the European Mediterranean Association, which will form fateful challenges for the public and the private sectors of Syrian industry. Five years went by since the negotiations with the European side started on. Till now, there are no complete prepared programs to rehabilitate and improve the competitive capacity of the Syrian industry yet. Naturally, preparing such a program needs a profound and detailed study of the existing industries, an analysis of the exact problems and the chances of resistance to face the international competition, as well as, to undestand the international market's position mainly, Arabs and Europeans, to decide the available chances and needs. The program should include bold decisions toward important matters, which are related to the suitable industrial specialization according to the international development of economy, beside the required support and within a limited period of time. It is clear that time is needed to achieve such a program, but the available remaining time is enough. Even though, the certainty of Arabic countries economical accordance and integration would assure the Syrian attitude in the European- Mediterranean Association's agreement, the fulfillment of the Grand Free Zone of Arab Trade's agreement and its time schedule is impeded. In fact, the schedule is obstructed through the extending bureaucracy, the executive authorities delay and the numerous exceptions, which were presented to the Social-Economical Arab Council under the pressure of some industrialists. Most industries, which started under a broad and complete protection policy of government, are unable to continue through the open economical environment. Except a little number of industrialists who understood the danger of the free competition's challenge and started improving the specifications of their products, most others still insist to have a continuous protection in order to imply their manipulating prices on the expense of consumers. Thus, after 15 years after the debut of restoration, the Syrian economy could not resolve the crisis, which prevented the use of the available human, natural and economical resources, properly. The Syrian economy is unprepared to face the challenges of the 21st Century. The most important first challenge is to correct the imbalance of national economy structure through filling the gaps between: - Recourses and uses. - Cash inflow and goods flow - Export and import. - Production and marketing. - Wages and prices. Without doubt, facing the challenges requires reviewing the tax, currency, and the financial and economical policies. The review could not be choosy, partial and superficial but based on a total future vision. Such achievements need implying a national program in which all the efforts and social power associate to fulfill the expectations with the effective role of the government to direct it. The second challenge is the rehabilitation of the private and public industrial sectors to reassure their competitive capacity to face the danger of globalization. It is necessary to determine whether to join the International Trade Organization, or not. Dealing with the danger of the external trade's globalization requires an Arabic economical collaboration on the national level and the dual level as the Syrian-Lebanese accordance for the Grand Free Zone of Arabic Trade's Agreement. To face the challenge successfully, there should be a rehabilitation for the industrial sector within a strategy of the industrial growth, which reviews the fields of specialization, sets priorities, marks policies and techniques to enable the Syrian industry of obtaining competitive qualities. Facing rehabilitation of the industrial sector challenge leads to another challenge, which is maintaining, setting and subjecting the modern technology. Obviously, there is no future for economy without an advanced technological base, or dynamism, which permits a continuous technology progress. Dealing with this challenge requires the preparation of national strategy of science and technology and to activate co-operation between scientific research centers and industrial organizations. Administrative reformation presents another serious challenge, which faces the Syrian economy. There was an ill phenomenon that excreted from the imbalance type of growth and the awkward practices. Thus, the wrong practices such as, the neglect of work, the escape from responsibilities, routine domination, the overcoming of personal interest instead of public well-being, the spread of corruption and the decline of function level, all these made the industrial restoration impossible without an administrative reformation. As the unbalanced growth led to the rise of sick phenomenon in the general administration, it also assisted the environmental pollution through the establishment of factories without considering the ecological elements. Actually, the fast expansion of industry without preserving the environmental demands came out with an ecological problem that was revealed through pollution, which resulted from the chemical materials, the dangerous poisoning wastes and the industrial accidents. As a matter of fact, the pollution affected desertification, sea-world's deterioration, ground water and drinking water's contamination, air pollution, health's professional danger, and noise. In addition to the industrial sources of pollution there were other sources which, clarified, through the poisoning gas of cars inside and outside cities, plus, the human waste. In spite of the insufficient procedures to preserve environment, it is a matter of urgency to activate a serious work of achievement. The guided use of the available water resources and the necessity to find out other resources for the future need is another serious and important challenge. In fact, the water problem is a severe and urgent one. It would be impossible to resolve this problem if it is not treated right now through the National Water Strategy to develop a new water resource and guided uses. When we talk about the negative reflections of the unbalanced growth since the middle of seventies, we need to review the incomes distribution. The unbalance of the industrial growth structure enabled few Syrians to make enormous capitals through different ways, such as, manipulation, speculation, brokerage or exploitation of the public job for personal interest. Actually, the inflation beside the unbalance between prices' increase and wages augment caused the diminishing of the real income. Consequently, most of the middle class people joined the low class people, whose living conditions deteriorated rapidly. Dealing with this challenge is not only a human necessity, but it is a base, which closely relates between the fair distribution of income on one side and the process of growth and the social settle on the other side. The failure of the reforming steps to liberate the Syrian economy from crisis was excepted. However, the economical procedures, which were taken over different periods, did not correct completely the deformation of the Syrian economy's structure, but reproduced an imbalance and defects. Mainly, because these procedures did not have a clear vision of the Syrian economy prospects for the future. On the other hand, these procedures did not come out of a general program of growth to develop the Syrian economy within a certain time in which all goals, priorities, methods and techniques were clearly defined. The economical procedures were, often, taken after the economical problems intensified, therefore, the treatment occurred fast and, improperly, studied with accordance to the danger of troubles and results. Therefore, the treatment reflected a reaction more than an actual action; this, of course, created other problems, which complicated the situations more and more. Having no comprehensive program for restoration, the economical procedures, therefore, were selective and partial with contradictions, sometimes, and were rushing or delayed, most of the times, with no attention to the priorities of the economical inter-penetration. Actually, the treatments came superficial, took care of crisis' appearance rather than the essential causes, gave attention to the less urgent matters on the expense of the fundamental ones, had weak influence and ineffective, plus, lacked harmony within. In the absence of a clear vision of the desired future of the Syrian economy and the lack of a comprehensive program of economical restoration, the executive institutions had extended the freedom to take partial procedures calmly which served the benefits of limited persons under the password of "Restoration". The lack of a future vision and a comprehensive program of restoration combine with the weak function of the High Economical Leadership in the government. The economical leadership was incapable of activating the executive economical institutions with concordance, besides, its hesitation to take decisions that concern all the important economical matters. Obviously, the high economical leadership's failure to practice its role effectively gave the opportunity for the individuals' personal conduct. Of course, the individuals' behavior impedes the government complete teamwork and does not assist to the co-operative coordination among the economical parts.
It is important to refer that the
differences of points of views between the Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of Economy and external trade that concern the join of The economical restoration process is a very complicated one with multiple sides and it needs a long time to be achieved. To reach a successful result, the process should start from a future vision of the Syrian economy and a comprehensive program, which covers all the economical sides. Meaning that, if the economical procedures of the Syrian government during the80ies were not fulfilled through banking, currency, financial and administrative reforming program, as well as, public sector's reformation, then, the possibility of developing a complete economical restoration to activate the Syrian economy is very scarce. The restoration process will have negative effects in the near future upon citizens who will have to endure more efforts and pressure. Therefore, citizens' participation in the comprehensive program's decisions, attaining support and understanding would guarantee the success of the reformation process. Moreover, extending the citizens' participation through the civil society organizations and the non-governmental domestic societies associations would help activating the public inspection to achieve the reforming program and save it from decay. In brief, the economical restoration process, as a national mission, requires for success an extended public base participation and support according to mutual understanding of goals and prospects, as well as, a social alliance among all parts on the base of a social-economical comprehensive program. __________ Foot notes: 1) Central Office of Statistics, "Describing Syria with Information", second edition 2000. 2) Same source.
3) Report of FAO & World Food program to
restore nutrition and crops in
4) Dr. Adnan Mustafa, Energy in 5) ESCWA, a report of 1998-1999 6) Government Institution of Planning, local note, 1972 7) Same source. 8) Same source. 9) Same source.
10) United Nation Organization for
Industrial Growth, "Policies & Strategies of Public Sector", 11) Same source. 12) Central Office of Statistics, statistic groups. 13) Same source. 14) Government Institution of Planning, previous source. 15) Dr. Nabeel Marzouk, "Dominating Techniques of Investing & Investment of Human Wealth", A lecture presented at General Union of Workers Association in Syria about the production and conditions of work during the period 18-19\12\1995. 16) United Nation Organization for Industrial Growth, previous source. 17) Dr. Nabeel Marzouk, previous source.
18) Dr. Husain Al Kadi,
" Financing Public Sector in 19) Central Office of Statistics, statistic group of 1996. 20) Dr. Nabeel Marzouk, previous source. 21) Dr. Aref Dalilah, "Budget Deficiency and Treating Methods", A lecture presented at Tuesday economical meeting No. 12, year 1999.
22) Ali Jamalo, "Grateful Land and Bitter
Harvest", Safeer Newspaper 23) Dr. Khaled Abd Al Noor, "Private Sector from Protection to Competition", A lecture presented at Tuesday economical meeting No. 13 of year 2000. 24) United Nation Organization for Industrial Growth, previous source. 25) Central Office of Statistics, statistic group of 1996. 26) Abd Alkader Al Naial, "Private Sector between Government Interference and Market Techniques", A study about the condition Of Syria, The Arabic Future magazin No. 222, September 1997. 27) Central Office of Statistics, statistic groups. 28) Abd Alkader Al Nial, previous source. 29) Riad Saif, " Export between Dream & Reality", A lecture presented at Tuesday economic meeting No.12, year 1999. 30) Abd Alkader Al Nial, previous source. 31) Dr. Mahmood Jelailati, "Syrian Tax System and Ways of Reforming it", A lecture presented at Tuesday economical meeting No.13, year 2000. 32) Dr. Khaled Abd Al Noor, "Rehabilitation of Syrian Industrial Sector: Reality Prospects", A lecture presented at Tuesday economical meeting, No. 12, year 1999.
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